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ABSTRACT
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the Eschenauer–Gligor
(EG) key pre-distribution scheme is a widely recognized way
to secure communications. Although the connectivity prop-
erties of secure WSNs with the EG scheme have been exten-
sively investigated, few results address physical transmission
constraints. These constraints reflect real–world implemen-
tations of WSNs in which two sensors have to be within a
certain distance from each other to communicate. In this pa-
per, we present the first zero–one laws for connectivity in
WSNs employing the EG scheme under transmission con-
straints. These laws improve recent results [10, 11] signifi-
cantly, are sharp, and help specify the critical transmission
ranges for connectivity. Our analytical findings, which are
also confirmed via numerical experiments, provide precise
guidelines for the design of secure WSNs in practice. The
application of our theoretical results to frequency hopping of
wireless networks is discussed in some detail.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Architecture and Design—Wireless communica-
tion; G.2.2 [Discrete Mathematics]: Graph Theory—
Network problems
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Connectivity, key predistribution, random graphs, secu-
rity, transmission constraints, wireless sensor networks.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Eschenauer–Gligor key pre-distribution scheme
[7] is regarded as a typical approach to secure commu-
nications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In this
scheme (referred to as the EG scheme hereafter), each
sensor is independently assigned the same number of
distinct cryptographic keys selected uniformly at ran-
dom from a key pool before deployment. After deploy-
ment, any two sensors establish a link between them, if
they share at least one key.
Connectivity in secureWSNs employing the EG scheme
has been extensively studied in the literature [2, 10, 11,
17,18,22]. However, most existing research [2,17,18,22]
unrealistically assumes unconstrained sensor-to-sensor
communications; i.e., any two sensors can communicate
regardless of the distance between them. Only two re-
cent results [10, 11] take transmission constraints into
consideration, but do not provide zero–one laws for con-
nectivity.
In this paper, we establish the first and also sharp
zero–one laws for connectivity in WSNs using the EG
scheme under practical transmission constraints. We
present significantly improved conditions for asymptotic
connectivity over those of Krishnan et al. [10] and Krzy-
wdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [11], and also demonstrate that
as the parameters move further away from these condi-
tions, the network rapidly becomes asymptotically dis-
connected. Our results provide useful guidelines for di-
mensioning the EG scheme and adjusting sensor trans-
mission power to ensure network connectivity. More-
over, our zero–one laws enable us to determine the crit-
ical transmission ranges for connectivity. Intuitively,
as the transmission range surpasses (resp., falls below)
the critical value and grows (resp., declines) further,
the network immediately enters an asymptotically con-
nected (resp., disconnected) state.
To model transmission constraints, we use the pop-
ular disk model [8, 12–14, 20], in which each sensor’s
transmission area is a disk with a uniform distance as
its radius; i.e., two sensors have to be within the radius
distance to communicye directly. The network area in
our analysis is either a torus or a square. The square ac-
counts for the real–world boundary effect whereby some
transmission region of a sensor close to the network
boundary may falls outside the network field. In con-
trast, the torus eliminates the boundary effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we describe the system model. Section 3 presents
the main results, leading to the discussion of critical
transmission ranges in Section 4. Afterwards, we ex-
plain the practicality of theorems’ conditions in Section
5. We provide numerical experiments in Section 6. In
Section 7, we discuss the application of our results to
1
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frequency hopping in detail. Section 8 reviews related
work; and Section 9 concludes the paper. The Appendix
contains the zero–law proofs and the sketch of the (sim-
pler) one–law proofs.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
In aWSN with size n and sensor set V={v1,v2,. . .,vn},
the EG scheme independently assigns a set of Kn dis-
tinct cryptographic keys, which are selected uniformly
at random from a pool of Pn keys, to each sensor node.
The set of keys of each sensor is called the key ring
and is denoted by Sx for sensor vx. The EG scheme
is modeled by a random key graph [10, 17, 22], denoted
by GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) in which an edge exists between
two nodes1 vx and vy if and only if they possess at
least one common key; i.e., the event [Sx ∩ Sy 6= ∅], de-
noted by Kxy, holds. As for the sensor distribution, we
consider that the n nodes are independently and uni-
formly deployed in a network area A. The disk model
induces a random geometric graph [8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20],
denoted by GRGG(n, rn,A), in which an edge exists be-
tween two sensors if and only if their distance is no
greater than rn. In a secure WSN using the EG scheme
under the disk model, two sensors vx and vy establish
a direct link between them if and only if they share at
least one key and are within distance rn. We denote
the event establishing this direct link by Exy. If we let
graph G(n, θn,A) model such a WSN, it is straightfor-
ward to see G(n, θn,A) is the intersection of random key
graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) and random geometric graph
GRGG(n, rn,A); namely,
G(n, θn,A) = GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A),
where parameters Kn, Pn and rn are together repre-
sented by θn. Also, if we let region A be either a torus
T or a square S, each with a unit area, we obtain the
two graphs
G(n, θn, T ) = GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn, T ),
and
G(n, θn,S) = GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,S).
We let ps be the probability of key sharing between
two sensors and note that ps is also the edge probability
in random key graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn). It holds that
ps = P[Kxy] = P[Sx ∩ Sy 6= ∅]. Clearly, if Pn < 2Kn,
then ps = 1. If Pn ≥ 2Kn, as shown in previous work
[2,17,22], we have ps = 1−
(
Pn−Kn
Kn
)/(
Pn
Kn
)
. If Pn ≥ 2Kn,
by [3, Lemma 6], it further holds that
ps ≤ Kn2/Pn. (1)
By [24, Lemma 8], (1) implies that if Kn
2/Pn = o(1),
then
ps = Kn
2/Pn ·
[
1−O(Kn2/Pn)] ∼ Kn2/Pn. (2)
1The terms sensor and node are interchangeable.
We will frequently use (1) and (2) throughout the pa-
per.2
Let pe be the probability that a link exists between
two sensors in the WSN modeled by graph G(n, θn,A);
i.e., pe is the edge probability in G(n, θn,A). It holds
that pe = P[Exy]. When A is the torus T , clearly pe
equals πrn
2 ·ps; and if Kn2/Pn = o(1), then pe ∼ πrn2 ·
Kn
2/Pn by (2). When A is the square S, it is a simple
matter to show pe ≤ πrn2 ·ps and pe ≥ (1−2rn)2 ·πrn2 ·
ps, yielding pe ∼ πrn2 · ps if rn = o(1). Therefore, on
S, if rn = o(1) and Kn2/Pn = o(1), we further obtain
pe ∼ πrn2 ·Kn2/Pn in view of (2).
In addition to random key graphs and random geo-
metric graphs, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph [6] has also been
extensively studied. An Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, pn)
is defined on a set of n nodes such that any two nodes es-
tablish an edge in between independently with probabil-
ity pn. As already shown in the literature [2,17,18,22],
random key graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graph GER(n, pn) have similar connectivity properties
when they are matched through edge probabilities; i.e.
when ps = pn. Hence, it would be tempting to ex-
ploit this analogy and conclude that connectivity in
G(n, θn,A) (i.e., GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,A)) is
similar to that of GER(n, pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,A), which
was recently established [15]. However tempting, such
heuristic approaches do not work as graphs GER(n, ps)
andGRKG(n,Kn, Pn) (and their respective intersections)
are quite different. For instance, in GER(n, ps), for
any three nodes vx, vy and vz , the event that vx has
edges with both vy and vz, is independent of the event
that vy and vz has an edge between them. However, in
GRKG(n,Kn, Pn), these two events are not independent
from each other, since the event that vx has edges with
both vy and vz means that the key rings Sy and Sz of vy
and vz respectively both have intersections with the key
ring Sx of vx. This has an impact on whether Sy and
Sz intersects. In fact, it has been formally proven [3,22]
that graphs GER(n, ps) and GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) exhibit
different characteristics in terms of properties including
clustering coefficient, number of triangles, etc.
3. THE MAIN RESULTS
We detail the main results below. The notation “ln”
stands for the natural logarithm function.
3.1 Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Torus
Theorem 1 presents a zero–one law for connectivity in
G(n, θn, T ), which models a secure WSN working under
the EG scheme and the disk model on a unit torus.
Theorem 1 Let graph G(n, θn, T ) be the intersection
of random key graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) and random ge-
2We use the standard Landau asymptotic notation
o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·) and ∼; in particular, for two pos-
itive functions f1(n) and f2(n), the relation f1(n) ∼ f2(n)
means limn→∞ f1(n)/f2(n) = 1.
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ometric graph GRGG(n, rn, T ) on a unit torus T , where
there exist some µn = ω(1) and constant c1 such that
max
{
lnn
ln lnn
, µn ·
√
Pn lnn
n
}
≤ Kn ≤ c1
√
Pn
lnn
(3)
for all n sufficiently large. For all n, let the sequence
αn be defined through
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=
lnn+ αn
n
. (4)
Then
lim
n→∞P
[
G(n, θn, T )
is connected.
]
=
0, if limn→∞αn = −∞,1, if lim
n→∞
αn =∞.
Remark 1 Under (3), we obtain Kn
2
Pn
≤ c12lnn = o(1).
Then as noted in Section 2, πrn
2 · Kn2Pn in (4) asymptot-
ically equals the edge probability in graph G(n, θn, T ).
3.2 Connectivity in a Secure WSN on a Square
Theorem 2 gives a zero–one law for connectivity in
G(n, θn,S), which models a secure WSN working under
the EG scheme and the disk model on a unit square.
Theorem 2 Let graph G(n, θn,S) be the intersection
of random key graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) and random ge-
ometric graph GRGG(n, rn,S) on a unit square S, where
there exist some constants c2 > 0, 0 < c3 < 1, c4 > 0
and νn = o(1) such that
c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3
≤ Kn ≤ min
{
νn ·
√
Pn
lnn
,
c4Pn
n lnn
}
(5)
for all n sufficiently large. Assume that Kn
2
Pn
· n1/3 lnn
either is bounded for all n or converges to∞ as n→∞,
and for all n let the sequence αn be defined through
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=

ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
+ αn
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln Pn
Kn2
− 4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
+ αn
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
.
(6)
Then
lim
n→∞
P
[
G(n, θn,S)
is connected.
]
=
0, if limn→∞αn = −∞,1, if lim
n→∞
αn =∞.
Remark 2 Under (5), we have Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn = o(1). If it
further holds rn = o(1) (this is true with confined αn),
then as established in Section 2, πrn
2 ·Kn2Pn in (6) asymp-
totically equals the edge probability in graph G(n, θn,S).
4. CRITICAL TRANSMISSION RANGES
4.1 The Critical Transmission Range for Con-
nectivity in a Secure WSN on a Unit Torus
By Theorem 1, under condition (3), we can determine
the critical transmission range r∗n(T ) for connectivity
in a secure WSN on a unit torus modeled by graph
G(n, θn, T ) through
π
[
r∗n(T )
]2 · Kn2
Pn
=
lnn
n
,
inducing the following expression of r∗n(T ):
r∗n(T ) =
√
lnn
πn
· Pn
Kn
2 . (7)
By (7), it is clear that with n fixed, r∗n(T ) decreases as
Kn
2
Pn
increases. This is expected since as mentioned in
Remark 1 after Theorem 1, Kn
2
Pn
asymptotically equals
the probability that two sensors share at least one key;
and πrn
2 · Kn2Pn asymptotically equals the edge proba-
bility in G(n, θn, T ). As the probability of key sharing
increases, sensors can reduce their transmission ranges
to maintain network connectivity.
We explain r∗n(T ) = o(1), which is anticipated as the
node density n grows to ∞. From Kn ≥
√
Pn lnn
n · µn
in (3), where µn = ω(1), it follows that
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
lnn
n
)
,
which along with (7) leads to r∗n(T ) = o(1).
4.2 The Critical Transmission Range for Con-
nectivity in a Secure WSN on a Unit Square
By Theorem 2, under condition (5), we can determine
the critical transmission range r∗n(S) for connectivity
in a secure WSN on a unit square modeled by graph
G(n, θn,S) through
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2
Pn
=

ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln Pn
Kn2
− 4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
(8)
so r∗n(S) is specified by
r∗n(S) =

√
ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
pinKn2
Pn
, for Kn
2
Pn
=ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
2
√
ln Pn
Kn2
− ln ln Pn
Kn2
pinKn2
Pn
, for Kn
2
Pn
=O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
.
(9)
First, we show that for fixed and sufficiently large
n, the critical transmission range r∗n(S) decreases as
3
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Kn
2
Pn
increases. Similar to the discussion on r∗n(T ), this
is also expected in that as the probability Kn
2
Pn
of key
sharing increases, sensors can reduce their transmission
ranges to maintain network connectivity. For the for-
mal argument we note that f(x) = lnx − ln lnx is an
increasing function of x for x > e since its derivative
f ′(x) = 1x(1 − 1lnx ) is positive, where e is the base of
ln. From condition (5), we have Pn
Kn2
≥ lnnνn2 , which im-
plies that Pn
Kn2
> e for all n sufficiently large. Hence,
for fixed and sufficiently large n,
(
ln Pn
Kn2
− ln ln Pn
Kn2
)
and
(
ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
)
are both increasing as Pn
Kn2
in-
creases, and hence decreasing as Kn
2
Pn
increases. Hence,
r∗n(S) also decreases as Kn
2
Pn
increases by (9).
Second, we show that the critical transmission range
r∗n(S) = o(1), which is anticipated as the node density
n grows to ∞. From condition (5), for all n sufficiently
large, we have c2
2 lnn
nc3 ≤ Kn
2
Pn
< c4
2
lnn , or
n lnn
c42
< nPn
Kn2
≤
nc3+1
c22 lnn
. This implies that in the case Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
of (8), the term π[r∗n(S)]2 · Kn
2
Pn
is Θ
(
lnn
n
)
. The sec-
ond case of (8), namely Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
or Pn
Kn2
=
Ω
(
n1/3 lnn
)
, and condition Pn
Kn2
≤ nc3c22 lnn derived from
(5) imply that term π[r∗n(S)]2 ·Kn
2
Pn
of (8) is also Θ
(
lnn
n
)
.
Hence, the term π[r∗n(S)]2 · Kn
2
Pn
is Θ
(
lnn
n
)
in (8). This
fact and condition Kn
2
Pn
≥ c22 lnnnc3 = ω
(
lnn
n
)
imply that
r∗n(S) = o(1).
Third, we relate the critical transmission ranges of
the unit square S and torus T , namely r∗n(S) ≥ r∗n(T )
for all n sufficiently large. Intuitively, this relationships
is caused by the boundary effects of S. Specifically, two
sensors close to opposite edges of the square may be
unable to establish a link on the square S but may have
a link in between on the torus T because of possible
wrap-around connections on the torus. In view of (7)
and (9), to prove r∗n(S) ≥ r∗n(T ), we only need to show
for all n sufficiently large that
(i)
(
ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
≥ lnn) for Kn2Pn = ω ( 1n1/3 lnn)
and
(ii)
(
4 ln Pn
Kn2
−4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
≥ lnn) for Kn2Pn =O ( 1n1/3 lnn).
To prove (i), we recall that condition (5) implies Pn
Kn2
≥
lnn
νn2
and nPn
Kn2
≤ nc3+1c22 lnn , where νn = o(1). It follows that,
for all n sufficiently large, Pn
Kn2
≥ lnnνn2 ≥ ln n
c3+1
c22 lnn
≥
ln nPn
Kn2
, implies ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
− lnn = ln Pn
Kn2
−
ln ln nPn
Kn2
≥ 0, which proves (i).
To prove (ii), recall that Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
implies
Pn
Kn2
= Ω
(
n1/3 lnn
)
, and hence Pn
Kn2
≥ c5n1/3 lnn for
some constant c5 > 0. Together with
Pn
Kn2
≤ nc3c22 lnn ,
this implies that, for all n sufficiently large, 4 ln Pn
Kn2
−
4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
≥ lnn, which proves (ii).
4.3 Phase Transition in the Critical Range r∗n(S)
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Theorem 2, a
phase transition occurs for r∗n(S) when Kn
2
Pn
is of the
order of 1
n1/3 lnn
, namely
lim
n→∞
{[
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2
Pn
]/(
lnn
n
)}
=

1+ lim
n→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
, for Kn
2
Pn
=ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 lim
n→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
, for Kn
2
Pn
=O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
.
(10)
To prove this corollary, we recall that Kn
2
Pn
≥ c12 lnnnc2
in (5), which implies that
ln ln
nPn
Kn
2 ≤ ln ln
nc2+1
c12 lnn
= o(lnn). (11)
For the case Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
of (8) and given (11),
if lim
n→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
= a, we obtain{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2
Pn
}/(
lnn
n
)
=
(
ln
nPn
Kn
2 − ln ln
nPn
Kn
2
)/
lnn
→ a+ 1, as n→∞. (12)
Condition (5) implies Pn
Kn2
≥ lnnc42 , which along with
Pn
Kn2
= o
(
n1/3 lnn
)
leads to a ∈ [0, 13 ].
For the case Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
of (8) and given (11),
if lim
n→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
= a, we have{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2
Pn
}/(
lnn
n
)
=
(
4 ln
Pn
Kn
2 − 4 ln ln
Pn
Kn
2
)/
lnn
→ 4a, as n→∞. (13)
Condition (5) implies Pn
Kn2
≤ nc3c22 lnn where 0 < c3 < 1.
This and Pn
Kn2
= Ω
(
n1/3 lnn
)
show a ∈ [ 13 , c3].
Finally, (12) and (13) together yield (10). To under-
stand lim
n→∞
(
ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn
)
= a, it is a simple matter to
check that such condition means for arbitrary ǫ > 0,
n−a−ǫ ≤ Kn
2
Pn
≤ n−a+ǫ, for n sufficiently large. (14)
Example values of Kn
2
Pn
satisfying (14) are c6n
−a(lnn)c7 ,
c8n
−a(lnn)c9(lnn lnn)c10 , where c6, c7, c8, c9 and c10 are
all arbitrary constants (of course, the coefficients c6 and
c8 should be positive).
Corollary 1 enables us to compare our results with the
best known to date (viz., Section 8), where the upper
4
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bounds on lim
n→∞
{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2Pn /( lnnn )} are 8 and 2π,
respectively [10,11]. Note that phase transitions are not
observed for the critical range r∗n(T ) of a torus T .
5. PRACTICALITY
In practical implementations of WSNs, Kn controls
the number of keys in each sensor’s memory, and should
be small [7] compared to both n and Pn due to limited
memory and computational capability of sensors.
5.1 Practicality of the Theorem 1 Conditions
By (3), we obtain constraints (i) Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
lnn
n
)
and
(ii) Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
, in view of Kn
2
Pn
≥ µn2 · lnnn with
µn = ω(1), and
Kn
2
Pn
≤ c12lnn . In addition, (3) enforces
(iii) Kn ≥ lnnln lnn . All these contraints (i), (ii) and (iii)
hold in real–world WSN applications.
5.2 Practicality of the Theorem 2 Conditions
We first discuss the relationship enforced between Pn
and Kn by (5). It is a simple matter to see (5) is equiv-
alent to the combination of (iv) KnPn ≤ c4n lnn and (v)
c2
2 lnn
nc3 ≤ Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn both for all n sufficiently large.
We then derive the constraint on Pn. From condition
(5), we obtain c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3 ≤ νn
√
Pn
lnn , and c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3 ≤
c4Pn
n lnn , both for all n sufficiently large. The former con-
straint leads to νn ≥ c2 lnnnc3/2 , which with νn = o(1) can be
easily satisfied by finding suitable νn (e.g., νn =
c2 lnn
nc3/3
)
in view of c3 > 0. It is easy to see that the latter con-
straint yields (vi) Pn ≥ c22c4−2n2−c3(lnn)3, for all n
sufficiently large.
We now present the constraint Kn. From condition
(vi) and Kn
2
Pn
≥ c22 lnnnc3 (derived from (5)), it holds that
(vii) Kn ≥ c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3 ≥ c22c4−1n1−c3(lnn)2 for all n
sufficiently large.
To explain the practicality of (5), it suffices to show
constraints (iv)–(vii) above are all satisfied in practice.
As long as c2, c4 > 0 and 0 < c3 < 1 hold, constants
c2, c3 and c4 can be specified arbitrarily. For c3 close to
1, we know that by (vi), the key pool size Pn can be the
node number n multiplied by a small fractional power
order of n; and by (vii), the key ring size Kn can have a
small fractional power order of n. These Kn and Pn are
practical. In addition, the condition that Kn
2
Pn
·n1/3 lnn
either is bounded for all n or converges to∞ as n→∞
is imposed to avoid the degenerate situation where as
n→∞, the sequence Kn2Pn · n1/3 lnn does not approach
to ∞ yet has a subsequence tending to ∞.
In particular, for Pn = Θ
(
n1+ε1
)
and Kn = Θ
(
nε2
)
with ε1 and ε2 satisfying 0 < ε1 < 1 and
ε1
2 < ε2 < ε1,
we can ensure (iv)–(vii) with suitably selected c2, c3
and c4; i.e., (5) holds. Such values of Pn and Kn are
very practical with ε1 and ε2 arbitrarily small. We set
c3 > 1 + ε1 − 2ε2, and specify c2 and c4 appropriately
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Figure 1: A plot of the empirical probability that graph
G(n,K, P, r,A) (i.e., G(n, θ,A)) is connected as a func-
tion of r with n = 2, 000, where A is either the unit
torus T or the unit square S.
(recall that 0 < c3 < 1 and c2, c4 > 0 also have to
be hold as conditions in Theorem 2). As (vi) and (vii)
are implied by (5), which is equivalent to the combi-
nation of (iv) and (v), we only need to show (iv) and
(v) as follows. For Pn = Θ
(
n1+ε1
)
and Kn = Θ
(
nε2
)
,
with ε2 < ε1, then
Kn
Pn
= Θ
(
n−1+ε2−ε1
)
, so (iv) holds
for arbitrary constant c4. Moreover, due to 2ε2 > ε1
and c3 > 1 + ε1 − 2ε2, then Kn2Pn = Θ
(
n−(1+ε1−2ε2)
)
so
Kn
2
Pn
≥ c22 lnnnc3 for all n sufficiently large with arbitrary
constant c2; and because of 1+ ε1− 2ε2 > 1− ε1 > 0, it
holds that Kn
2
Pn
= Θ
(
n−(1+ε1−2ε2)
)
, so Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn for all
n sufficiently large after we find suitable νn = o(1); e.g.,
νn = Θ
(
n−(1+ε1−2ε2)/3
)
. Therefore, we have demon-
strated both (iv) and (v), thus validating (5).
6. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We present numerical simulation in the non-asymptotic
regime to support our asymptotic results. We write
graph G(n, θn,A) as G(n,Kn, Pn, rn,A). In Figure 1,
we depict the probability that graph G(n,K, P, r,A)
(i.e., G(n, θ,A)) is connected, where A is either the unit
torus T or the unit square S; and the subscript n is re-
moved since we fix the number of nodes at n = 2, 000
in all experiments. For each pair (A,K, P, r), we gen-
erate 500 independent samples of G(n,K, P, r,A) and
count the number of times that the obtained graphs are
connected. Then the count divided by 500 becomes the
empirical probability for connectivity. As illustrated, we
observe the evident threshold behavior in the probabil-
ity that G(n,K, P, r,A) is connected as such probability
transitions from zero to one as r varies slightly from a
certain value.
7. APPLICATION IN FREQUENCY HOPPING
Frequency hopping is a classic approach for trans-
mitting wireless signals by switching a carrier among
different frequency channels. Frequency hopping offers
improved communication resistance to narrowband in-
terference, jamming attacks, and signal interception by
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eavesdroppers. It also enables more efficient bandwidth
utilization than fixed-frequency transmission [9]. For
these reasons, military radio systems, such as HAVE QUICK
and SINCGARS [1], use frequency hopping extensively. A
typical method of implementing frequency hopping is
for the sender and receiver to first agree on a secret seed
and a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). Then
the seed is input to the PRNG by both the sender and
the receiver to produce a sequence of pseudo-random
frequencies, each of which is used for communication in
a time interval [9].
We consider a wireless network of n nodes where nodes
establish shared secret seeds for frequency hopping as
follows. Each node uniformly and independently selects
Kn secret seeds out of a secret pool consisting of Pn se-
cret seeds. Two nodes can communicate with each other
via frequency hopping if and only if they share at least
one secret seed and are within each other’s transmission
range. Two nodes can derive a unique seed from the
shared seeds in several ways. For example, the unique
seed could be the cryptographic hash of the concate-
nated seeds shared between two nodes [5]. Alternately,
if two nodes u and v share a seed kuv (which might
also be shared by other pairs of nodes), they can estab-
lish a probabilistically unique secret seed H(u, v, kuv),
where the two node identities are ordered and H is an
entropy-preserving cryptographic hash function.
The above way of bootstrapping seeds has the follow-
ing advantages. First, without knowledge of a PRNG
seed, an adversary cannot predict in advance the fre-
quency that two nodes will use. In addition, each com-
municating pair of nodes can generate a secret seed that
differs from the seed that another nearby node pair uses.
Then it is also likely that distinct communicating node
pairs located in the same vicinity utilize different fre-
quencies. Thus, without any additional coordination
protocol to avoid using the same frequency, distinct
communicating node pairs nearby could work simulta-
neously without causing co-channel interference.
Now we construct a graph Gf based on the above sce-
nario. Each of the n wireless nodes represents a node
in Gf . There exists an edge between two nodes in Gf if
and only if they can communicate with each other via
frequency hopping; i.e., they share a secret seed and are
in communication range with each other. Therefore, if
all n nodes are uniformly and independently deployed
in a network area A, which is either a unit torus T or
a unit square S, and all nodes have the same trans-
mission range rn, then Gf is exactly G(n, θn, T ) when
A = T and G(n, θn,S) when A = S. Our zero–one laws
on connectivity of G(n, θn, T ) and G(n, θn,S), allow us
to find the network parameters under which Gf is con-
nected. This provides useful guideline for the design of
large-scale wireless networks with frequency hopping.
8. RELATED WORK
lim
n→∞
(
ln Kn
2
Pn
/
lnn
)
lim
n→∞
{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]
2
·Kn2Pn
/(
lnn
n
)}
−1 −1/3
2π
0
0
8
4
4/3
1
Upper bounds of MFCS result [11]
Upper bounds of ISIT result [10]
Exact values
Figure 2: A comparison of the connectivity results
for graph G(n, θn,S), the intersection of random key
graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) and random geometric graph
GRGG(n, rn,A), where r∗n(S) is the critical transmission
range for connectivity in G(n, θn,S).
Yi [23] et al. consider graph G(n, θn,A), where the
network region A is either a disk D or a square S, each
of unit area. They show that for graph G(n, θn,D) or
G(n, θn,S), if πrn2 · Kn2Pn = lnn+αn and Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
lnn
)
,
the number of isolated nodes asymptotically follows a
Poisson distribution with mean e−α. Pishro-Nik et al.
[16] also obtain such result on asymptotic Poisson dis-
tribution with condition Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
lnn
)
generalized to
Kn
2
Pn
= Ω
(
1
lnn
)
. They further investigate connectivity in
graphG(n, θn,S). In practical WSNs, Kn is expected to
be several orders of magnitude smaller than Pn, so it of-
ten holds that Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, which is not addressed in
the two work above [16,23] and is addressed in our the-
orems. Recently, for graph G(n, θn,S), Krzywdzin´ski
and Rybarczyk [11] and Krishnan et al. [10] obtain con-
nectivity results, covering the case of Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
.
We elaborate their theoretical findings below and ex-
plain that our results significantly improve theirs. Krzy-
wdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [11] present that in G(n, θn,S)
on S, if πrn2 · Kn2Pn ≥ 8 lnnn with Kn ≥ 2 and Pn = ω(1),
then G(n, θn,S) is almost surely3 connected. Krish-
nan et al. [10] demonstrate that if πrn
2 · Kn2Pn ≥ 2π lnnn
with Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), then G(n, θn,S)
3An event occurs almost surely if its probability approaches
to 1 as n→∞.
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is almost surely connected. Both only provide upper
bounds on lim
n→∞
{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2Pn /( lnnn )}, with one be-
ing 8 and the other being 2π, where r∗n(S) is the critical
transmission range for connectivity in G(n, θn,S). In
this paper, we determine the exact value of this limit
by deriving r∗n(S). As illustrated in Figure 2, we plot
the term lim
n→∞
{
π
[
r∗n(S)
]2 · Kn2Pn /( lnnn )} with respect to
lim
n→∞
(
ln Kn
2
Pn
/
lnn
)
. The curve of the exact values is
based on our result (10) in Section 4.
For random key graph GRKG(n,Kn, Pn), Blackburn
and Gerke [2], Rybarczyk [17], and Yag˘an andMakowski
[22] establish zero–one laws for its connectivity. In par-
ticular, Rybarczyk’s result is that with Kn ≥ 2 for
all n sufficiently large and Kn
2
Pn
= lnn+αnn , then graph
GRKG(n,Kn, Pn) is almost surely connected (resp., dis-
connected) if lim
n→∞
αn =∞ (resp., lim
n→∞
αn = −∞). Ry-
barczyk [18] also shows zero–one laws for k-connectivity,
where k-connectivity means that the graph remains con-
nected despite the removal of any (k − 1) nodes.
Random geometric graph GRGG(n, rn,A) has been
widely studied due to its application to wireless net-
works. Gupta and Kumar [8] show that when A is a
unit-area disk D and πrn2 = lnn+αnn , GRGG(n, rn,D) is
almost surely connected if and only if limn→∞ αn =∞.
Penrose [13] explores k-connectivity in GRGG(n, r,A),
where A is a d-dimensional unit cube with d ≥ 2. For
A being the unit torus T , he obtains that with ρn
denoting the minimum rn to ensure k-connectivity in
GRGG(n, rn, T ), where k ≥ 1, then the probability that
πρn
2 is at most lnn + (k − 1) ln lnn − ln[(k − 1)!] + α
asymptotically converges to e−e
−α
. Li et al. [12] prove
that with k ≥ 2, to have graph GRGG(n, r,S) asymp-
totically k-connected with probability at least e−e
−α
for
some α, a sufficient condition is that the term πrn
2
is at least lnn + (2k − 3) ln lnn − 2 ln[(k − 1)!] + 2α;
and a necessary condition is that πrn
2 is no less than
lnn + (k − 1) ln lnn − ln[(k − 1)!] + α. For k ≥ 2,
Wan et al. [20] determine the exact formula of rn such
that graph GRGG(n, r,S) or GRGG(n, rn,D) is asymp-
totically k-connected with probability e−e
−α
, where as
noted above, D is a disk of unit area.
9. CONCLUSION
We establish the first and sharp zero–one laws for con-
nectivity in WSNs employing the widely-used Eschenauer–
Gligor key pre-distribution scheme under transmission
constraints. Such zero–one laws significantly improve
recent results [10, 11] in the literature. Our theoretical
findings are confirmed via numerical experiments, and
are applied to frequency hopping of wireless networks.
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APPENDIX
A. USEFUL LEMMAS
Lemma 1 (Palm’s Theory [14]) Consider a Poisson
process with density λ counting the number of events. If
independent of the Poisson process, each event further
does not survive with probability p, then the number of
survived events is a Poisson variable with mean pλ.
We defer the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 to Appendix D.
As detailed in Section B.1.1 later, we demonstrate the
zero–law for graph G(n, θn,A) by proving the same re-
sult for its Poissonized version, graph GPoisson(n, θn,A),
where the only difference between GPoisson(n, θn,A) and
G(n, θn,A) is that the node distribution of the former
is a homogeneous Poisson point process with intensity
n on A while that of the latter is a uniform n-point pro-
cess. Then we present Lemma 2 on GPoisson(n, θn,A).
Lemma 2 In graph GPoisson(n, θn,A), let Ix be the event
that node vx is isolated, and Drn(vˆx) be the intersection
of A and the disk centered at position vˆx ∈ A with radius
rn. We have
P[Ix] =
∫
A
e−nps|Drn(vˆx)| dvˆx; (15)
and with φu denoting P
[
Kxj ∩Kyj | (|Sxy| = u)
]
, where
u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn, then for u = 1, 2, . . . ,Kn,
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]
=
∫
A
∫
A\Drn (vˆx)
e−n{ps|Drn (vˆx)|+ps|Drn(vˆy)|−φu|Drn (vˆx)∩Drn (vˆy)|}dvˆxdvˆy ,
(16)
and
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = 0)]
=
∫
A
∫
A
e−n{ps|Drn (vˆx)|+ps|Drn(vˆy)|−φ0 |Drn(vˆx)∩Drn (vˆy)|}dvˆxdvˆy,
(17)
with φ0 meaning φu when u = 0.
Lemma 3 Under (3) and (4), for all n sufficiently large,
with αn < 0, we obtain πrn
2n · Kn2Pn ≤ lnn, rn = o(1),
and πrn
2psn = lnn+ αn −O(1).
Lemma 4 Under (5) and (6), we have the following:
ln nps = Θ(lnn); and for |αn| = O(ln lnn), then (a)
rn = o(1), πrn
2 · Kn2Pn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
and πrn
2 ·ps = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
;
and (b) with δn for all n be defined via
πrn
2ps=

ln n
ps
− ln ln n
ps
+ δn
n , for ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln 1
ps
− 4 ln ln 1
ps
+ δn
n , for ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
(18)
it holds that δn = αn ±O(1).
Lemma 5 If Pn ≥ 3Kn, then for any three distinct
nodes vx, vy and vz and for any u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn,
P[(Kxz ∩Kyz | (|Sxy| = u)] ≤ uKn
Pn
+
2Kn
4
Pn
2 .
Lemma 6 In graph GPoisson(n, θn, T ) under conditions
(3) and (4) with |αn| = O(ln lnn), then
nP[Ix] = o(n
ǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0. (19)
Lemma 7 In graph GPoisson(n, θn,S) under conditions
(5) and (6) with |αn| = O(ln lnn), then
nP[Ix] = o(n
ǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0. (20)
Lemma 8 For A being T under conditions (3) and (4)
with |αn| = O(ln lnn), or A being S under conditions
(5) and (6) also with |αn| = O(ln lnn), then with m
denoting
⌈
n−n 12+c0⌉, where c0 is an arbitrary constant
with 0 < c0 <
1
2 , it holds that∣∣P [G(n, θn,A) has no isolated node. ]
− P [GPoisson(m, θn,A) has no isolated node. ]
∣∣ = o(1).
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Lemma 9 Consider graph GER(n,pn)∩GRGG(n,rn,T ),
where GER(n, pn) is an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph; and
GRGG(n, rn, T ) is a random geometric graph on a unit
torus T . Let the sequence νn for all n be defined through
πrn
2pn =
lnn+ νn
n
.
Then as n→∞,
P
 GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn, T )
is connected.
→
0, if limn→∞ νn = −∞,1, if lim
n→∞ νn =∞.
Lemma 10 ([15, Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 8.5]).
Consider graph GER(n, pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,S ) with
pn = o
(
1
lnn
)
, where GER(n, pn) is an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph;
and GRGG(n, rn,S) is a random geometric graph on a
unit square S. With pn · n1/3 lnn either being bounded
for all n or converging to ∞ as n→∞, let the sequence
νn for all n be defined through
πrn
2pn
=


ln
n
pn
− ln ln
n
pn
+ νn
n
, for pn = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln
1
pn
− 4 ln ln
1
pn
+ νn
n
, for
pn = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
and rn = n
−Ω(1).
(22)
Then as n→∞,
P
 GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,S )
is connected.
→
0, if limn→∞ νn = −∞,1, if lim
n→∞
νn =∞.
Lemma 11 If Kn = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, KnPn = O
(
1
n lnn
)
and
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
, then there exists pn with
pn =
Kn
2
Pn
·
[
1−O
(
1
lnn
)]
(23)
such that for any topology A and any monotone increas-
ing graph property4 P,
P[GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) has P. ]
≥ P[GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) has P. ]− o(1).
B. ESTABLISHING THE ZERO–LAWS
We first explain the basic ideas of the proofs.
B.1 Basic Ideas of the Proofs
4A graph property is called monotone increasing if it holds
under the addition of edges in a graph.
B.1.1 Poissonization and de-Poissonization
We demonstrate the zero–laws using the standard
Poissonization technique [13, 14]. The idea is that the
zero–law for graph G(n, θn,A) follows once we establish
the result with Poissonization; i.e., once we obtain the
zero–law for graph GPoisson(n, θn,A). See Lemma 8 for
the rigorous argument.
B.1.2 Method of the moments
We reuse the notation in Lemma 2; i.e., here in graph
GPoisson(n, θn,A), where A is the unit torus T or the
unit square S, let Ix be the event that node vx is iso-
lated, and Drn(vˆx) be the intersection of A and the disk
centered at position vˆx ∈ A with radius rn.
We use the method of the moments for the proof.
Note that n is the expected number of nodes in graph
GPoisson(n, θn,A). By [24, Fact 1 and Lemma 1], the
zero–law is proved once we demonstrate
lim
n→∞
nP[Ix] =∞, (24)
and
P[Ix ∩ Iy] ≤ {P[Ix]}2 · [1 + o(1)]. (25)
Below we prove (24) and (25), respectively. Note that
given condition lim
n→∞
αn = −∞ in the zero–laws, we
obtain αn < 0 for all n sufficiently large.
B.2 Proving the Zero–Law of Theorem 1
As just noted, we have αn < 0 for all n sufficiently
large so we can use results from Lemma 3.
B.2.1 Establishing (24) on the unit torus T
By Lemma 2, it holds that
P[Ix] =
∫
T
e−nps|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx.
Since T is a unit torus, it holds that Drn(vˆx) = πrn2
for any vˆx ∈ T . Then
P[Ix] = e
−πrn2psn · |T | = e−πrn2psn. (26)
Using πrn
2psn = lnn+αn−O(1) from Lemma 3 in (26)
and considering lim
n→∞
αn = −∞, we obtain
nP[Ix] = ne
− lnn−αn−O(1) →∞ as n→∞.
B.2.2 Establishing (25) on the unit torus T
By the law of total probability, it is clear that
P[Ix ∩ Iy] =
Kn∑
u=0
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]P[ |Sxy| = u ].
(27)
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Applying Lemma 2 to (27), we derive
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]
≤
∫
A
∫
A
e−n{ps|Drn (vˆx)|+ps|Drn (vˆy)|−φu|Drn (vˆx)∩Drn (vˆy)|}dvˆxdvˆy.
(28)
Here we consider A as the torus T . For any vˆx ∈ T and
any vˆy ∈ T , we have Drn(vˆx) = πrn2 and Drn(vˆy) =
πrn
2. If vˆy ∈ A \D2rn(vˆx) (i.e., vˆx and vˆy have a dis-
tance greater than 2rn), where D2rn(vˆx) is the intersec-
tion of T and the disk centered at vˆx with radius 2rn,
then |Drn(vˆx) ∩Drn(vˆy)| = 0; and if vˆy ∈ D2rn(vˆx),
then |Drn(vˆx) ∩Drn(vˆy)| ≤ πrn2. Therefore, from (28),
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]
≤
(
1− 4πrn2 + 4πrn2eπrn2φun
)
e−2πrn
2psn. (29)
Substituting (29) into (27), we obtain
P[Ix ∩ Iy ]
≤ (1− 4πrn2)e−2πrn
2psn
+ 4πrn
2e−2πrn
2psn
Kn∑
u=0
{
P[ |Sxy| = u ]eπrn
2φun
}
. (30)
Applying rn = o(1) from Lemma 3 to (30), then (25)
is proved once we show
Kn∑
u=0
{
P[ |Sxy| = u ]eπrn2φun
}
= O(1). (31)
By [24, Lemma 10], P[|Sxy| = u] ≤ 1u!
(
Kn
2
Pn−Kn
)u
holds,
which along with Lemma 5 gives rise to
Kn∑
u=0
{
P[ |Sxy| = u ]eπrn2φun
}
≤ e2πrn2n·
Kn
4
Pn2
+ Kn
2
Pn−Kn
·epirn
2n
Kn
Pn
. (32)
Given Kn
2
Pn
≤ c12lnn , we have Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
and thus
Kn
2
Pn−Kn ≤ 2Kn
2
Pn
for all n sufficiently large. In view of
πrn
2n · Kn2Pn ≤ lnn from Lemma 3 and Kn ≥ lnnln lnn by
condition (3), it holds that for all n sufficiently large,
eπrn
2nKnPn ≤ eKn−1 lnn ≤ eln lnn = lnn. (33)
Using (33), Kn
2
Pn−Kn ≤ 2Kn
2
Pn
, πrn
2n · Kn2Pn ≤ lnn and
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
in (32), we establish (31). As explained
before, the proof of (25) is now completed.
B.3 Proving the Zero–Law of Theorem 2
We will explain that |αn| can be confined asO(ln lnn).
To see this for the zero–law, it suffices to show
The zero–law of Theorem 2 under |αn| = O(ln lnn)⇒
The zero–law of Theorem 2 regardless of |αn|=O(ln lnn).
S1
S1
S1
S1
S3
S3S3
S3
S2
S2
S2S2
S0
rn
rn
rn
rn
1
1
rn
2
rn
2
rn
2
rn
2
Figure 3: We partition the unit square S into S0,S1,S2
and S3. Note that each of S1,S2 and S3 has four parts.
Letting α˜n be max{αn,− ln lnn}, we define r˜n through
πr˜2n · Kn
2
Pn
=

ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
+ α˜n
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln Pn
Kn2
− 4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
+ α˜n
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
.
(34)
It is clear that rn ≤ r˜n. We write graph G(n, θn,S)
as G(n,Kn, Pn, rn,S). Then we can construct graph
G(n,Kn, Pn, r˜n,S) as follows such that it is a super-
graph ofG(n,Kn, Pn, rn,S). InG(n,Kn, Pn, rn,S), with
each node increasing its transmission range from rn to
r˜n, then the graph becomes G(n,Kn, Pn, r˜n,S).
For the zero–law, we consider lim
n→∞
αn = −∞, which
yields lim
n→∞
α˜n = −∞ and |α˜n| = O(ln lnn). If we have
the zero–law of Theorem 2 under |αn| = O(ln lnn),
then even |αn| = O(ln lnn) does not hold, in view of
lim
n→∞
α˜n = −∞ and |α˜n| = O(ln lnn), we apply the
zero–law to graph G(n,Kn, Pn, r˜n,S) and obtain that
under (5) and (34), graph G(n,Kn, Pn, r˜n,S) is dis-
connected almost surely. Then as a subgraph of graph
G(n,Kn, Pn, r˜n,S), graphG(n,Kn, Pn, rn,S) is also dis-
connected. Hence, we obtain the zero–law of Theorem
2 regardless of the condition |αn| = O(ln lnn).
B.3.1 Establishing (24) on the unit square S
By Lemma 2, P[Ix] =
∫
S e
−npsDrn (vˆx) dvˆx holds. To
compute P[Ix] based on this, we partition S in a way
similar to that by Li et al. [12] and Wan et al. [20].
Specifically, S is divided into S0,S1,S2 and S3, respec-
tively, as illustrated in Figure 3 (note that rn <
1
2 for all
n sufficiently large due to rn = o(1) by Lemma 4). S0
consists of all points each with a distance greater than
rn to its nearest edge of S, whereas S3 is the area in
which each point has distances no greater than rn to at
least two edges of S. We further divide S \ {S0 ∪ S3}
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into S1 and S2 as follows. In S \ {S0 ∪ S3}, S1 compro-
mise points whose distance to the nearest edge of S is
no greater than rn2 , while the remaining area is S2; i.e.,S2 = S \ {S0 ∪ S1 ∪ S3}.
For i = 0, 1, 2, 3, we define
Ti : =
∫
Si
e−nps|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx. (35)
Then it is clear that P[Ix] =
∑3
i=0 Ti. From (18) in
Lemma 4, there exists δn with δn = αn ± O(1) such
that (i) if ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, then
πrn
2ps =
ln nps − ln ln nps + δn
n
; (36)
and (ii) if ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, then
πrn
2ps =
4 ln 1ps − 4 ln ln 1ps + δn
n
. (37)
We explain below in detail that in case (i), lim
n→∞
T1 =∞
follows, yielding lim
n→∞
P[Ix] =∞ (i.e., (24)).
To evaluate T1, we introduce some notation as follows.
For any position vˆx ∈ S1, we let the distance from vˆx to
the nearest edge of the square S be g, where 0 ≤ g ≤ rn2 .
For vˆx ∈ S1, clearly |Drn(vˆx)| is determined given g;
and we denote it by H(g). As used before, we have
Lagrange’s notation for differentiation; namely, the first
and second derivatives of a function f are denoted by
f ′ and f ′′, respectively. It is easy to derive
H(g) = [π − arccos(g/rn)]rn2 + g
√
rn2 − g2, (38)
H ′(g) = 2
√
rn2 − g2, (39)
and
H ′′(g) = −2g/
√
rn2 − g2. (40)
Since S1 consists of four rectangles, each of which has
length 1− 2rn and width rn2 , it follows that
T1=
∫
S1
e−psn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx=4(1−2rn)
∫ rn
2
0
e−psnH(g) dg.
(41)
For simplicity, we write H(g) as H . Then
e−psnH dg
= −(psn)−1(H ′)−1 de−psnH
= −(psn)−1
{
d
[
(H ′)−1e−psnH
]−e−psnH d(H ′)−1}
= (psn)
−1{d[−(H ′)−1e−psnH]− (H ′)−2H ′′e−psnHdg}.
(42)
From (42) and H ′′ ≤ 0,∫ rn
2
0
e−psnH(g) dg ≥ e
−psnH(0)
psnH ′(0)
− e
−psnH( rn2 )
psnH ′
(
rn
2
) . (43)
From (38) and (39), then H(0) = πrn
2/2, H ′(0) =
2rn, H
(
rn
2
)
=
(
2
3π +
√
3
4
)
rn
2 and H ′
(
rn
2
)
=
√
3rn.
Using these and πrn
2psn = Θ(lnn) from Lemma 4 in
(43), we derive∫ rn
2
0
e−psnH(g) dg ≥ e
−πrn2psn/2
2rnpsn
· [1− o(1)],
which along with rn = o(1) from Lemma 4 is applied to
(41) so that
P[Ix] ≥ T1 ≥ 2(rnpsn)−1e−πrn2psn/2 · [1− o(1)]. (44)
From (36), we get
e−πrn
2psn = e− ln
n
ps
+ln ln nps−δn =
ps
n
e−δn ln
n
ps
, (45)
and with ∆ denoting πrn
2psn (note that ∆ = Θ(lnn)
from Lemma 4),
rn = π
− 1
2 ps
− 1
2n−
1
2∆
1
2 . (46)
Then using (45) and (46) in (44), it follows that
nP[Ix]
≥ n ·2π 12 ps− 12n− 12∆− 12 ·p
1
2
s n
− 1
2 e−
δn
2
(
ln
n
ps
) 1
2
·[1−o(1)]
≥ 2π 12
(
∆−1 ln
n
ps
) 1
2
e−
δn
2 · [1−o(1)].
From ∆ = Θ(lnn) and ln nps = Θ(lnn) in Lemma 4,
with lim
n→∞
αn = −∞ producing lim
n→∞
δn = −∞, we have
lim
n→∞
{
nP[Ix]
}
=∞.
With ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, by [15, Equation (8.21)], it
follows that
lim
n→∞
{
nP[Ix]
}
=∞ if lim
n→∞
δn = −∞.
B.3.2 Establishing (25) on the unit square S
Clearly, (27) and (28) still hold. Here we consider the
network area A as the unit square S. For any vˆx ∈ S
and any vˆy ∈ S, we have |Drn(vˆx) ∩Drn(vˆy)| ≤ πrn2,
which is applied to (28) so that
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]
≤ eπrn2φun
∫
S
e−nps|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx
∫
S
e−nps|Drn (vˆy)| dvˆy
= eπrn
2φun · {P[Ix]}2, (47)
where we use the result that
∫
S e
−nps|Drn(vˆx)| dvˆx and∫
S e
−nps|Drn(vˆy)| dvˆy both equal P[Ix] in the last step of
(47). Then using (47) in (27), we obtain
P[Ix ∩ Iy ]≤{P[Ix]}2 · Kn∑
u=0
{
P[|Sxy|= u]eπrn2φun
}
. (48)
Since (32) also holds here, we know from (32) and (48)
that the proof of (25) on S is completed once we prove
2πrn
2n · Kn
4
Pn
2 +
Kn
2
Pn −Kn · e
πrn
2nKnPn = o(1). (49)
11
Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton) 2014
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2014.7028605
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=7028605
Under (5) with νn = o(1), we have
Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn = o
(
1
lnn
)
,
so (2) holds. From Lemma 4, it is always true that
πrn
2n · Kn2Pn = Θ(lnn), which along with Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
and condition Kn ≥ c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3 in (5) with c3 > 0 leads
to πrn
2n · Kn4
Pn2
= o(1) and
eπrn
2nKnPn = eπrn
2nKn
2
Pn
·Kn−1 → 1, as n→∞. (50)
Then (49) is proved, completing the proof of (25) on S.
C. ESTABLISHING THE ONE–LAWS
From (5), we have Kn = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, KnPn = O
(
1
n lnn
)
and Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
. Therefore, in view that all con-
ditions of Lemma 11 are satisfied, and considering that
connectivity is a monotone increasing graph property,
we apply Lemma 11 to obtain for some pn with (23),
P[GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,S) is connected.]
≥P[GER(n, pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,S) is connected.]−o(1).
(51)
Here we also define νn through (22). We will show
that under (5) and (6), νn specified in (22) of Lemma
10 equals αn ±O(1), where αn is set in (6).
In order to assess νn, we see from (22) that it is useful
to evaluate ln 1pn and ln ln
1
pn
. Given (23), we obtain
ln
1
pn
= ln
Pn
Kn
2 − ln
[
1−O
(
1
lnn
)]
= ln
Pn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn
)
, (52)
and with Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
,
ln ln
1
pn
= ln
[
ln
Pn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn
)]
= ln
{
ln
Pn
Kn
2
[
1−O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)]}
= ln ln
Pn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)
. (53)
By (23), it holds that
pn ∼ Kn
2
Pn
,
so we have
pn = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
if and only if
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
(54)
and
pn =O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
if and only if
Kn
2
Pn
=O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
.
(55)
Now it is ready to compute νn according to (22). On
the one hand, for Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
which is equivalent
to pn = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
in view of (54), we apply (22) (52)
and (53) to derive
νn = πrn
2pn · n−
(
ln
n
pn
− ln ln n
pn
)
= πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
·
[
1−O
(
1
lnn
)]
· n
−
[
ln
nPn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn
)]
+ ln ln
nPn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)
(56)
With πrn
2 · Kn2Pn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
,
νn = πrn
2 ·Kn
2
Pn
·n− ln nPn
Kn
2 + ln ln
nPn
Kn
2
−Θ(lnn) ·O
(
1
lnn
)
+O
(
1
lnn
)
−O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)
= αn±O(1). (57)
On the other hand, for Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
that is
equivalent to pn = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
in view of (55), we use
(22) (52) and (53) to obtain
νn = πrn
2pn · n−
(
4 ln
1
pn
− 4 ln ln 1
pn
)
= πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
·
[
1−O
(
1
lnn
)]
· n
− 4
[
ln
Pn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn
)]
+ 4
[
ln ln
Pn
Kn
2 −O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)]
(58)
Then
νn = πrn
2 ·Kn
2
Pn
·n− 4 ln Pn
Kn
2 +4 ln ln
Pn
Kn
2
−Θ(lnn) ·O
(
1
lnn
)
+O
(
1
lnn
)
−O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)
= αn±O(1). (59)
Summarizing (57) and (59), with (5) and (6), νn de-
fined in (22) equals αn±O(1) specified in (6). Then by
Lemmas 10 and 11, the result follows.
D. ESTABLISHING THE LEMMAS
D.1 The Proof of Lemma 2
When node vx is at position vˆx, the number of nodes
within area Drn(vˆx) follows a Poisson distribution with
mean nDrn(vˆx); and to have an edge with vx in graph
GPoisson(n, θn,A), a node not only has to be within a
Drn(vˆx) but also has to share at least a key with node
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vx. Then by Lemma 1, the number of nodes neighboring
to vx at vˆx follows a Poisson distribution with mean
nps|Drn(vˆx)|; and the probability that such number is
0 equals e−nps|Drn (vˆx)|. Integrating vˆx overA, we derive
the probability that node vx is isolated (i.e., P[Ix]) via
P[Ix] = n
∫
A
e−nps|Drn(vˆx)| dvˆx;
namely, (15) follows.
Below we demonstrate (16) and (17). For the ease of
explanation, we define
E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy| = u)]
as the event that
• nodes vx and vy are at positions vˆx and vˆy, respec-
tively;
• and vx and vy share a certain number u of keys,
where u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn.
Conditioning on E[(vx at vˆx) ∩ (vy at vˆy) ∩ (|Sxy| = u)],
we further define N(E) as the number of nodes different
from vx and vy, and neighboring to at least one of vx and
vy. By Lemma 1, N(E) follows a Poisson distribution
with mean
n · P
[
Exj ∪Eyj
∣∣∣∣ (|Sxy| = u) ∩ (vx is at vˆx),∩ (vy is at vˆy).
]
, (60)
which we denote by λvˆx,vˆy,u below.
Conditioning on E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy|= u)],
event Ix ∩ Iy (i.e., the event that nodes vx and vy are
both isolated) is equivalent to N(E) ∩Exy. Condition-
ing on event (|Sxy| = u), for event Exy to occur, the
distance between vx at vˆx and vy at vˆy has to be greater
than distance rn for u = 1, 2, . . . ,Kn; and there is no
such requirement for u = 0 as (|Sxy| = 0) already im-
plies Exy. Therefore, we obtain
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy
∣∣∣ E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy| = 0)]]
= P
[
N(E) = 0]
= e−nλvˆx,vˆy,0 , (61)
where λvˆx,vˆy,0 stands for λvˆx,vˆy,u when u = 0; and for
u = 1, 2, . . . ,Kn,
• if vˆx and vˆy has a distance greater than rn, then
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy
∣∣∣ E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy| = u)]]
= P
[
N(E) = 0]
= e−nλvˆx,vˆy,u ; (62)
• and if vˆx and vˆy has a distance no greater than
distance rn, then
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy
∣∣∣ E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy| = u)]]
= 0. (63)
For u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn, integrating
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy
∣∣∣ E[(vx at vˆx)∩ (vy at vˆy)∩ (|Sxy| = u)]]
with vˆx over A and vˆy also over A, we then obtain
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)
]
. Hence, in view of (61–63),
it is easy to establish
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = u)]
=
∫
A
∫
A\Dr(vˆx)
e−nλvˆx,vˆy,u dvˆx dvˆy ; (64)
and
P
[
Ix ∩ Iy | (|Sxy| = 0)]
=
∫
A
∫
A
e−nλvˆx,vˆy,0 dvˆx dvˆy. (65)
To evaluate (64) and (65), we calculate λvˆx,vˆy,u below
based on its expression in (60). By (60), it is clear that
λvˆx,vˆy,u
= n · P
[
Exj
∣∣∣∣ (|Sxy| = u) ∩ (vx is at vˆx),∩ (vy is at vˆy).
]
+ n · P
[
Exj
∣∣∣∣ (|Sxy| = u) ∩ (vx is at vˆx),∩ (vy is at vˆy).
]
− n · P
[
Exj ∩Eyj
∣∣∣∣ (|Sxy| = u) ∩ (vx is at vˆx),∩ (vy is at vˆy).
]
.
(66)
To further assess (66), we have the following observa-
tions. To begin with,
Exj = Kxj ∩
[
vj is within Dr(vˆx)
]
. (67)
Each of Kxj and Kyj is independent of (|Sxy| = u), but
Kxj ∩Kyj is not independent of (|Sxy| = u). Clearly,
P
[
Kxj | (|Sxy| = u)
]
= P
[
Kxj
]
= ps, (68)
and
P
[
Kyj | (|Sxy| = u)
]
= P
[
Kyj
]
= ps. (69)
We also recall
φu = P
[
Kxj ∩Kyj | (|Sxy| = u)]. (70)
Then we use (67–70) in (66) to derive
λvˆx,vˆy,u = nps ·
[∣∣Drn(vˆx)∣∣ + ∣∣Drn(vˆy)∣∣]
− nφu ·
∣∣Drn(vˆx)∩Drn(vˆy)∣∣. (71)
Substituting (71) into (64) and (65), we establish (16)
and (17), respectively. 
D.2 The Proof of Lemma 3
Given (4) and αn < 0, we obtain πrn
2 · Kn2Pn ·n ≤ lnn,
which together with Kn
2
Pn
≥ µn2 lnnn = ω
(
lnn
n
)
resulted
from condition (3) brings about rn = o(1) because of
πr2n = O
(
lnn
n
) · [ω( lnnn )]−1 = o(1). With condition (3),
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it follows that Kn
2
Pn
≤ c12lnn = O( 1lnn ). Then from (2) (4)
and πrn
2 · Kn2Pn · n ≤ lnn, we obtain
πrn
2psn = πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
· n ·
[
1−O
(
Kn
2
Pn
)]
= lnn+ αn −O(lnn) ·O
(
1
lnn
)
= lnn+ αn −O(1).
D.3 The Proof of Lemma 4
From c2
2 lnn
nc3 ≤ Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn , (1) and (2), there exists
ϕn with lim
n→∞
ϕn = 1 such that
c2
2 lnn
nc3 · ϕn ≤ ps ≤ νn
2
lnn .
Then ln(n/ps) ≤ (1 + c3) lnn − ln lnn − lnϕn − 2 ln c2
and ln(n/ps) ≥ lnn + ln lnn − 2 ln νn hold, leading to
ln(n/ps) = Θ(lnn). Similarly, ln
nPn
Kn2
= Θ(lnn). For
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, then in view of ln nPn
Kn2
= Θ(lnn),
πrn
2 ·Kn2Pn ·n = ln nPnKn2 −ln ln
nPn
Kn2
+αn resulted from (6),
and |αn| = O(ln lnn), we obtain πrn2 · Kn2Pn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
.
On the other hand, for Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, then we
apply ln Pn
Kn2
= ln
[
ω
(
n1/3 lnn
)]
= Θ(lnn) and condi-
tion πrn
2 · Kn2Pn ·n4 ln PnKn2 −4 ln ln
Pn
Kn2
+αn from (6) and
|αn| = O(ln lnn) to derive πrn2 · Kn2Pn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
. Hence,
under either Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
or Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
it holds that πrn
2 · Kn2Pn = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
, which along with (2)
and Kn
2
Pn
≥ c22 lnnnc3 resulting in πrn2 · ps = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
and
rn = o(1), respectively.
In order to assess δn, we see from (18) that it is useful
to evaluate ln 1ps and ln ln
1
ps
. From Kn
2
Pn
≤ νn2lnn and (2),
then we obtain ln 1ps = ln
Pn
Kn2
−O ( 1lnn), which leads to
ln ln 1ps =ln
[
ln Pn
Kn2
−O ( 1lnn) ]=ln ln PnKn2−O ( 1lnn ln lnn).
Now it is ready to compute δn. In view of (2), clearly
ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
(resp., ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
) is equivalent
to ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
(resp., Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
). We
apply the expressions of ln 1ps and ln ln
1
ps
above, πrn
2 ·
Kn
2
Pn
·n = Θ(lnn), (6) and (18) to show that under either
ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
or ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, we always have
δn=αn−Θ(lnn) ·O
(
1
lnn
)
+O
(
1
lnn
)
−O
(
1
lnn ln lnn
)
=αn±O(1).
D.4 The Proof of Lemma 5
To begin with, it holds that
P[Kxz ∩Kyz | (|Sxy| = u)]
= P[Kxz | (|Sxy| = u)] + P[Kyz | (|Sxy| = u)]
− (1 − P[Kxz ∩Kyz | (|Sxy| = u)])
= 2ps − 1 +
(
Pn − (2Kn − u)
Kn
)/(
Pn
Kn
)
. (72)
By [22, Lemma 7.1] and [24, Fact 2], it follows that(
Pn − (2Kn − u)
Kn
)/(
Pn
Kn
)
≤
(
1− 2Kn − u
Pn
)Kn
≤ 1− (2Kn − u)Kn
Pn
·Kn + 1
2
[
(2Kn − u)Kn
Pn
]2
. (73)
Applying (1) (i.e., ps ≤ Kn2Pn ) and (73) to (72), we have
P[(Kxz ∩Kyz | (|Sxy| = u)] ≤ uKn
Pn
+
2Kn
4
Pn
2 .
D.5 The Proof of Lemma 6
From (26), it follows that
nP[Ix] = ne
−πrn2psn = ne− lnn−αn±O(1).
With |αn| = O(ln lnn), we have for any constant ǫ > 0,
nP[Ix] = o(n
ǫ).
D.6 The Proof of Lemma 7
As in Section B.3.1, we partition S according to Fig-
ure 3 and define Ti for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 according to (35);
i.e.,
Ti : =
∫
Si
e−nps|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx.
Then
P[Ix] =
3∑
i=0
Ti. (74)
To compute T0, we use Drn(vˆx) = πrn
2 for any posi-
tion vˆx ∈ S0, and |S0| = (1− 2rn)2 ≤ 1 to derive
T0 =
∫
S0
e−psn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx ≤ e−πrn
2psn. (75)
We present below an upper bound on T1. In view of
(42), we further have
− (H ′)−2H ′′e−psnH dg
= −(H ′)−3H ′′e−psnH dH
= −(psn)−1(H ′)−3H ′′ d
(− e−psnH). (76)
For 0 ≤ g ≤ rn2 , it holds from (39) and (40) that
− H
′′
(H ′)3
=
g
4(rn2 − g2)2 ≤
rn
2
4× ( 34rn2)2 =
2
9rn3
. (77)
By (76) and (77), it follows that
−
∫ rn
2
0
(H ′)−2H ′′e−psnHdg ≤ 2
9rn3psn
∫ rn
2
0
d
(− e−psnH).
(78)
Applying (78) to (42),∫ rn
2
0
e−psnH(g) dg ≤ e
−psnH(0)
psnH ′(0)
+
2e−psnH(0)
9rn3ps2n2
. (79)
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Using (79) in (41),
T1 ≤ 4e
−psnH(0)
psnH ′(0)
+
8e−psnH(0)
9rn3ps2n2
. (80)
From (38) and (39), thenH(0) = πrn
2/2 and’H ′(0) =
2rn. Using these and πrn
2psn = Θ(lnn) from Lemma
4 in (80), we derive
T1 ≤ 2(rnpsn)−1e−πrn2psn/2 · [1 + o(1)]. (81)
Now we assess T2. For vˆx ∈ S2, when the distance
from vˆx to the nearest edge of S equals rn2 , the area
|Drn(vˆx)| reaches its minimum c0πrn2, where c0 := 23 +√
3
4π . Then with |S2| = 2rn(1− 2rn) ≤ 2rn, it follows
T2 =
∫
S2
e−psn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx ≤ 2rne−c0πrn2psn. (82)
To evaluate T3, we apply πrn
2/4 ≤ Drn(vˆx) ≤ πrn2
for any vˆx ∈ S3, and |S3| = 4rn2 to obtain
T3 =
∫
S3
e−psn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx ≤ 4rn2e−πrn2psn/4. (83)
Substituting (75) (81) (82) and (83) into (74), we de-
rive
P[Ix] ≤ e−πrn2psn + 2(rnpsn)−1e−πrn2psn/2 · [1 + o(1)]
+ 2rne
−c0πrn2psn + 4rn2e−πrn
2psn/4. (84)
We discuss the following cases (i) and (ii), in which
either Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
or Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
holds.
We also let ∆ denote πrn
2psn.
(i) We consider Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, which also yields
ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
by (2). Using (45) and (46) in (84),
we obtain
nP[Ix] ≤ pse−δn ln n
ps
+ 2π
1
2∆−
1
2
(
ln
n
ps
) 1
2
e−
δn
2 · [1 + o(1)]
+ 2π−
1
2 ps
c0− 12n
1
2
−c0∆
1
2
(
ln
n
ps
)c0
e−c0δn
+ 4π−1ps−
3
4n−
1
4∆e−
δn
4
(
ln
n
ps
) 1
4
.
From ps = ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, ∆ = Θ(lnn) and ln nps = Θ(lnn)
by Lemma 4, with |αn| = O(ln lnn) producing |δn| =
O(ln lnn), we have
nP[Ix] = o(n
ǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
(ii) We consider Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, which also yields
ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
by (2). We obtain
rn = π
− 1
2 ps
− 1
2n−
1
2∆
1
2 , (85)
and from (37),
e−πrn
2psn = e−4 ln
1
ps
+4 ln ln 1ps−δn = ps4
(
ln
1
ps
)4
e−δn .
(86)
Applying (85) and (86) to (84), we derive
nP[Ix] ≤ ps4
(
ln
1
ps
)4
e−δn
+ 2π
1
2 ps
3
2n
1
2∆−
1
2
(
ln
n
ps
)2
e−
δn
2
+ 2π−
1
2 ps
4c0− 12n
1
2∆
1
2
(
ln
1
ps
)4c0
e−c0δn
+ 4π−1∆e−
δn
4 ln
1
ps
.
From∆ = Θ(lnn) and ln 1ps = Θ(lnn), ps = O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
and 13 (4c0 − 12 ) > 12 , with |αn| = O(ln lnn) producing|δn| = O(ln lnn), we have
nP[Ix] = o(n
ǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
D.7 The Proof of Lemma 8
We will establish Lemma 8 using the standard de-
Poissonization technique [13,14,21]. LetM be the num-
ber of nodes in graphGPoisson(m, θn,A). Clearly,M fol-
lows a Poisson distribution with mean m. From Cheby-
shev’s inequality, for any positive t,
P[|M −m| ≥ t√m] ≤ t−2. (87)
Without loss of generosity, we regard n − n 12+c0 as an
integer. With t := n−m√
m
, substituting m = n − n 12+c0
into (87),
P
[
M ≤ n− 2n 12+c0 or M ≥ n] ≤ n− n 12+c0
n1+2c0
= o(1).
(88)
Hence, n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n holds almost surely.
When M < n, we construct a coupling C between
graphs G(n, θn,A) and GPoisson(m, θn,A), by letting
the former be the result of adding to the latter graph
(n −M) nodes uniformly distributed on A. Then VP
denoting the node set of GPoisson(m, θn,A) is a sub-
set of V being the node set of G(n, θn,A). In addi-
tion, it is straightforward to see that the edge set of
GPoisson(m, θn,A) is also a subset of that of G(n, θn,A).
Then under coupling C, graph GPoisson(m, θn,A) is a
subgraph of G(n, θn,A).
We denote byDX (resp.,DP ) the set of isolated nodes
in G(n, θn,A) (resp., GPoisson(m, θn,A)). To establish
Lemma 8, we prove
|P[DX 6= ∅]− P[DP 6= ∅]| = o(1),
which follows once we demonstrate P[DX 6= DP ] = o(1)
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in view of∣∣P[DX 6= ∅]− P[DP 6= ∅]∣∣
=
∣∣P[(DX 6= ∅)∩(DP = ∅)]− P[(DP 6= ∅)∩(DX = ∅)]∣∣
≤ P[DX 6= DP ].
It is straightforward to see
P[DX 6= DP ]
≤ P[(DP \DX 6= ∅)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)]
+ P
[
(DX \DP 6= ∅)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)]
+ P
[
M ≤ n− 2n 12+c0 or M ≥ n],
then given (88), we will prove P[DX 6= DP ] = o(1) and
thus establish Lemma 8 once showing
P
[
(DP \DX 6= ∅)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)] = o(1),
(89)
and
P
[
(DX \DP 6= ∅)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)] = o(1).
(90)
In proving (89) and (90), with n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n,
we consider the coupling C under whichGPoisson(m, θn,A)
is a subgraph of G(n, θn,A).
D.7.1 The Proof of (89)
Event (DP \ DX 6= ∅) happens if and only if there
exists at least one node vi such that vi ∈ DP and
vi /∈ DX ; i.e., vi is isolated in GPoisson(m, θn,A) but
is not isolated in G(n, θn,A) since vi ∈ V by vi ∈ DP .
Then there exists at least one node v′ in VP := V \ VP
such that v′ and vi are neighbors in G(n, θn,A). Due
to VP = n −M < 2n
1
2
+c0 , considering that pe is the
edge probability in G(n, θn,A), then with L denoting
the number of isolated nodes in GPoisson(m, θn,A), it
follows via a union bound that
P
[(
DP \DX 6= ∅
)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)]
≤ L · 2n 12+c0 · pe. (91)
For A = T , we will prove that under conditions (3)
and (4) with |αn| = O(ln lnn); i.e., with some µn = ω(1)
and constant c1,
max
{
lnn
ln lnn
, µn ·
√
Pn lnn
n
}
≤ Kn ≤ c1
√
Pn
lnn
,
for all n sufficiently large, and
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=
lnn+ αn
n
,
then there exist some µ˜n = ω(1) and constant c˜1 such
that
max
{
lnm
ln lnm
,
√
Pn lnm
m
· µ˜n
}
≤ Kn ≤ c˜1
√
Pn
lnm
(92)
for all m sufficiently large (i.e., for all n sufficiently
large) and
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=
lnm+ αn ± o(1)
m
, (93)
in order to apply Lemma 6 to GPoisson(m, θn, T ).
We establish (92) as follows. First, with m < n, it
follows that lnmln lnm <
lnn
ln lnn for all n sufficiently large
since function f(x) = ln xln lnx is monotone increasing with
x for x > ee by f ′(x) = ln ln x−1x(ln ln x)2 > 0. Thus, under
Kn ≥ lnnln lnn , it holds that Kn ≥ lnmln lnm . Second, with
m = n − n 12+c0 and 0 < c0 < 12 , then lnmm ∼ lnnn ,
which along with Kn ≥
√
Pn lnn
n · µn and µn = ω(1)
leads to that there exists some µ˜n = ω(1) such that
Kn ≥
√
Pn lnm
m · µ˜n. Third, with m ∼ n, for all n
sufficiently large, we obtain from Kn ≤ c1
√
Pn
lnn that
Kn ≤ c˜1
√
Pn
lnm . Summarizing the three points above,
(92) holds for all m sufficiently large.
We demonstrate (93) in view of
m · πrn2 · Kn
2
Pn
− (lnm+ αn)
= m · lnn+ αn
n
− (lnm+ αn)
=
(
1− nc0− 12 )(lnn+ αn)− lnn− ln (1− nc0− 12 )− αn
= ±o(1).
Then with (92) and (93), we use Lemma 6 to derive
L = o(mǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0. (94)
For A = S, we will prove that under conditions (5)
and (6) with |αn| = O(ln lnn); i.e., with constants c2 >
0, 0 < c3 < 1, c4 > 0 and νn = o(1),
c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3
≤ Kn ≤ min
{
νn ·
√
Pn
lnn
,
c4Pn
n lnn
}
for all n sufficiently large, the condition that Kn
2
Pn
·n1/3 lnn
either is bounded for all n or converges to∞ as n→∞,
and
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=

ln nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
+ αn
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
,
4 ln Pn
Kn2
− 4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
+ αn
n , for
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
;
then there exist some constants c˜2 > 0, 0 < c˜3 < 1,
c˜4 > 0 and ν˜n = o(1), such that
c˜2
√
Pn lnm
mc˜3
≤ Kn ≤ min
{
ν˜n ·
√
Pn
lnm
,
c˜4Pn
m lnm
}
(95)
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for all m sufficiently large (i.e., for all n sufficiently
large); and Kn
2
Pn
· m1/3 lnm either is bounded for all
m or converges to ∞ as m → ∞ (i.e., as n → ∞);
and α˜n = αn ±O(1) with sequence α˜n for all n defined
through
πrn
2 · Kn
2
Pn
=

ln mPn
Kn2
− ln ln mPn
Kn2
+ α˜n
m , for
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
,
4 ln Pn
Kn2
− 4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
+ α˜n
m , for
Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
,
(96)
in order to apply Lemma 7 to GPoisson(m, θn,S).
We establish (95) as follows. First, due to Kn ≥
c2
√
Pn lnn
nc3 and
lnm
mc3 ∼ lnnnc3 , then with c˜3 = c3, there
exits some c˜2 > 0 such that Kn ≥ c˜2
√
Pn lnm
mc˜3
. Second,
from lnm ∼ lnn and Kn ≤ νn ·
√
Pn
lnn , there exists
some ν˜n = o(1) such that Kn ≤ ν˜n ·
√
Pn
lnm . Third,
from m lnm ∼ n lnn and Kn ≤ c4Pnn lnn , there exists some
c˜4 > 0 such that Kn ≤ c˜4Pnm lnm . Summarizing the three
points above, (95) holds for all m sufficiently large.
We demonstrate (96) below. Clearly, it holds that
m1/3 lnm ∼ n1/3 lnn. This implies that condition Kn2Pn =
ω
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
(resp., Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
) is equivalent
to Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
(resp., Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
).
On the one hand, for Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
equivalent
to Kn
2
Pn
= ω
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, we obtain
α˜n
= m · πrn2 · Kn
2
Pn
−
(
ln
mPn
Kn
2 − ln ln
mPn
Kn
2
)
= m · ln
nPn
Kn2
− ln ln nPn
Kn2
+αn
n
−
(
ln
mPn
Kn
2 − ln ln
mPn
Kn
2
)
= αn ±O(1).
On the other hand, for Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
m1/3 lnm
)
equiva-
lent to Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
n1/3 lnn
)
, we obtain
α˜n
=m · πrn2 · Kn
2
Pn
−
(
4 ln
Pn
Kn
2 − 4 ln ln
Pn
Kn
2
)
=m·4 ln
Pn
Kn2
−4 ln ln Pn
Kn2
+αn
n
−
(
4 ln
Pn
Kn
2−4 ln ln
Pn
Kn
2
)
=αn ±O(1).
Then with (95) and (96), we use Lemma 7 to derive
L = o(mǫ) for any constant ǫ > 0.
To summarize, for either A = T or A = S, it al-
ways holds that L = o(mǫ) = o(nǫ) for any constant
ǫ > 0, where L is the number of isolated nodes in
GPoisson(m, θn,A). For A = T , we have pe = πrn2 · ps.
For A = S, we obtain pe ≤ πrn2 · ps. Also, we have
πrn
2 · ps = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
. Then from (91), with ǫ set as
0 < ǫ < 12 − c0, it follows that
P
[(
DP \DX 6= ∅
)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)]
≤ o(nǫ) · 2n 12+c0 ·Θ
(
lnn
n
)
= o(1).
D.7.2 The Proof of (90)
Event (DX \DP 6= ∅) occurs if and only if there exists
at least one node vj such that vj ∈ DX and vj /∈ DP .
With vj ∈ DX , then vj is isolated in G(n, θn,A), which
along with vj /∈ DP leads to vj /∈ VP and vj ∈ VP
(i.e., vj is not a node in graph GPoisson(m, θn,A)). This
can be seen by contradiction. Supposing vj /∈ VP , since
vj is isolated in G(n, θn,A), then vj is also isolated in
GPoisson(m, θn,A), contradicting vj /∈ DP . Then with
q denoting the probability that a node is isolated in
G(n, θn,A), it follows via a union bound that
P
[(
DX \DP 6= ∅
)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)]
≤ 2n 12+c0 · q.
Due to q = Θ
(
lnn
n
)
and c0 <
1
2 , then
P
[(
DX \DP 6= ∅
)∩ (n− 2n 12+c0 < M < n)] = o(1).
D.8 The Proof of Lemma 9
By [15, Theorem 2.3], if there exists some β ∈ [0,∞]
such that
lim
n→∞
n
∫
T
e−nps|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx = β, (97)
then
lim
n→∞
P
[
GER(n, pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T )
is connected.
]
= e−β. (98)
Given |Drn(vˆx)| = πrn2 for any vˆx ∈ T , we obtain
n
∫
T
e−npn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx = n · e−πrn
2pnn · |T |
= ne−πrn
2pnn. (99)
Applying condition πrn
2pnn = lnn+νn to (99), we have
lim
n→∞n
∫
T
e−npn|Drn (vˆx)| dvˆx = lim
n→∞ e
−νn
=
∞, if limn→∞ νn = −∞,0, if lim
n→∞
νn =∞.
(100)
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In view of (97) (98) and (100), it follows that
lim
n→∞
P
[
GER(n, pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T )
is connected.
]
=
e
−∞, if lim
n→∞ νn = −∞,
e0, if lim
n→∞
νn =∞,
=
0, if limn→∞ νn = −∞,1, if lim
n→∞
νn =∞.
(101)
Hence, Lemma 9 is proved.
D.9 The Proof of Lemma 11
We first explain the idea of coupling between random
graphs. As used by Rybarczyk [18], a coupling of two
random graphs G1 and G2 means a probability space on
which random graphs G′1 and G
′
2 are defined such that
G′1 andG
′
2 have the same distributions asG1 andG2, re-
spectively. We denote the coupling by (G1, G2, G
′
1, G
′
2).
Following Rybarczyk’s notation [18], we write
G1 1−o(1) G2 (102)
if there exists a coupling (G1, G2, G
′
1, G
′
2), such that un-
der the coupling G′1 is a subgraph of G
′
2 with probability
1− o(1).
We then describe a graph model called random in-
tersection graph, which has been extensively studied in
the literature. A random intersection graph denoted by
GRIG(n, Pn, pn) is defined on n nodes as follows. There
exist a key pool of size Pn; and each key in the pool is
added to each sensor with probability pn.
In view of [4, Lemma 4], if
pnPn = ω (lnn) (103)
and for all n sufficiently large5,
Kn ≥ pnPn +
√
3(pnPn + lnn) lnn, (104)
then
GRIG(n, pn, Pn) 1−o(1) GRKG(n,Kn, Pn). (105)
By [18, Lemma 3], if
pn = o (1/n) , (106)
and for all n sufficiently large,
pn
2Pn < 1, (107)
with sn defined through
sn := pn
2Pn ·
(
1− npn + 2pn − pn
2Pn
2
)
, (108)
then
GER(n, sn) 1−o(1) GRIG(n, pn, Pn). (109)
5The term “for all n sufficiently large” means “for any n ≥
N , where N is selected appropriately”.
By [19], the relation of “1−o(1)” is transitive. In
other words, for any three graphs Ga, Gb and Gc, if
Ga 1−o(1) Gb and Gb 1−o(1) Gc, then Ga 1−o(1) Gc.
Then given (105) and (109), we obtain that under (103)
(104) (106) (107) and (108), it follows that
GER(n, sn) 1−o(1) GRKG(n,Kn, Pn). (110)
By [19], from (110), it further holds that
GER(n, sn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A)
1−o(1)
[
GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A)]. (111)
By [19], from (111), it is easy to see that for any mono-
tone increasing graph property P,
P[GRKG(n,Kn, Pn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) has P ]
≥ P[GER(n, qn)∩GRGG(n, rn,A) has P ]− o(1).
(112)
In view of (112), the proof of Lemma 11 is completed
with qn set as sn if we show that given some appropri-
ately selected pn and the conditions in Lemma 11, then
(103) (104) (106) (107) and
sn =
Kn
2
Pn
·
[
1−O
(
1
lnn
)]
(113)
with sn defined in (108) all follow.
We will do so by setting pn via
pn =
Kn
Pn
(
1−
√
3 lnn
Kn
)
. (114)
To begin with, from (114) and conditionKn = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
,
it is clear that
pn =
Kn
Pn
· [1− o(1)], (115)
which along with Kn = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
further leads to
pnPn = Kn · [1− o(1)] = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
= ω (lnn) .
Given (114) and condition Kn = Ω
(
(lnn)3
)
, we obtain
(104) in that for all n sufficiently large,
Kn −
[
pnPn +
√
3(pnPn + lnn) lnn
]
= Kn
√
3 lnn
Kn
−
√√√√3[Kn
(
1−
√
3 lnn
Kn
)
+ lnn
]
lnn
=
√
3Kn lnn−
√
3
[
Kn+
√
lnn
(√
lnn−
√
3Kn
)]
lnn
≥
√
3Kn lnn−
√
3Kn lnn
= 0.
From (115) and condition KnPn = O
(
1
n lnn
)
, it is clear to
see (106) due to
pn =
Kn
Pn
· [1− o(1)] = O
(
1
n lnn
)
. (116)
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From (115) and condition Kn
2
Pn
= O
(
1
lnn
)
, then (107) is
true
pn
2Pn =
Kn
2
Pn
· {[1− o(1)]}2 = O( 1
lnn
)
. (117)
Below we will show (113), where sn is specified in (108).
Owing to pn
2Pn ∼ Kn
2
Pn
given in (117), we obtain from
(108) that
sn =
Kn
2
Pn
· [1− o(1)] ·
[
1− (n− 2)pn + 2pn − pn
2Pn
2
]
,
which will result in (113) once we derive
−(n− 2)pn − pn
2Pn
2
= −O
(
1
lnn
)
. (118)
(118) clearly follows from (116) and (117).
We have proved that (103) (104) (106) (107) and
(113) all hold with pn and sn set in (114) and (108), re-
spectively, provided the conditions in Lemma 11. Then
as noted before, with qn set as sn, we have established
Lemma 11 in view of (112). 
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